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1 Introduction
Whether tort liability or regulation is best suited to cope with accidents is one of the
lasting discussions in the law and economics literature. In the ﬁeld of environmental
risk regulation, deﬁning the optimal policy-mix between regulation and liability is an
issue of a tantamount importance if one wants that private actors fully internalize the
impacts of their decisions on third-parties and the environment. In a world plagued
with various informational asymmetries and much uncertainty on the outcomes of
production processes that put the environment at risk, relying on either the regulator
or the judge are two corrective policies which are well-known to diﬀer both in terms
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1of their eﬀectiveness from an incentive viewpoint but also in terms of their respective
administrative costs.
Regulation of environmentally risky ventures requires indeed to enforce stan-
dards of care that should be undertaken by private actors and to check compliance.
Regulation usually takes the form of routine procedures which take place ex ante,
i.e. before any harm ever occurs.1 Tort liability instead is used ex post through
law suits which are only triggered following an accident. These procedures have a
signiﬁcant incentive role by forcing responsible parties to pay for damages. A proper
compensation of the victims or the cleanup of contaminated sites in the case of a
disaster require that injuring parties disgorge cash. The judge has a stake in discov-
ering the ﬁnancial capacity of injuring parties, whereas much of the structure and
organization of risky industries precisely aims at escaping those liability payments.2
This brief description of the two kinds of policies available to control environ-
mental risk already stresses a fundamental diﬀerence. Whereas risk regulators have
expertise to check whether ﬁrms shirk on care or not, judges have instead developed
the legal expertise to unveil the true assets value of these ﬁrms once held liable.3
Those two distinct dimensions of enforcement deal in fact with two incentive prob-
lems of a quite diﬀerent nature. First, it is indeed hard to ascertain whether a ﬁrm
follows a standard of due care or not and some (random) regulatory inspection is
needed: a moral hazard problem. Second, it is often diﬃcult to assess the true value
of the ﬁrm’s assets: an adverse selection problem. The judge’s intervention helps
unveiling this value by piercing the corporate veil behind which environmentally
risky ﬁrms may hide.
In this paper, we take as given this functional separation of tasks between the
regulator and the judge and determine the optimal policy mix. Both the judge
and the regulator participate to the enforcement of corrective policies and may
impose either explicit ﬁnes or implicit punishments (such as reputational losses) on
ﬁrms when they are caught shirking on care or hiding assets. The judiciary and the
regulatory branches both contribute to the design of the overall package of incentives
and thus, they both improve welfare.
However, the exact interaction between these tasks is far from being obvious. On
the one hand, the threat of having the true value of the ﬁrm’s assets being revealed
in a lawsuit might help the regulator to set up the right amount of ﬁnes. On the
other hand, the threat of being caught shirking by a regulator increases the ﬁrm’s
incentives to exert care. This reduces the likelihood of an accident and thus of an
ex post investigation of the ﬁrm’s assets by the judge.
1For instance, the French Directions R´ egionales de l’Industrie de la Recherche et de
l’Environnement are agencies authorizing agricultural or industrial plants –among which 1148
present a risk a major accident involving hazardous substances– presenting a risk of pollution or
nuisance to exert their activity, and are in charge for checking whether ﬁrms follow procedures and
guidelines for the risk management. In the U.S., such agencies as Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) or EPA regularly investigate care.
2See Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) for an empirical analysis of these strategies.
3The U.S. 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) gives an example of the legal arsenal developed by judges to ﬁnd out the money needed
to restore contaminated sites. Under CERCLA, any owner or operator of an environmentally risky
venture may be found liable for the potentiel losses generated by the ﬁrm’s activity if the latter is
itself judgment-proof, i.e., if its assets cannot cover the cleanup costs of the contaminated site.
2This paper analyzes this two-way interaction between regulatory and legal inter-
ventions and describes the optimal package for enforcement policies in various legal
environments. We investigate three diﬀerent scenarii of increasing complexity.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the judge only checks the value of the ﬁrm’s assets if the
regulator did not perform any inspection himself. This setting serves as a useful
benchmark for the rest of our investigation. When regulatory enforcement is rather
eﬃcient, the standard of due care is easily enforced. It is then relatively more
tempting for the ﬁrm to hide its assets than to shirk on care since the judge is
quite unlikely to intervene. Decreasing the probability of regulatory enforcement
and, at the same time, increasing the resources that the judge devotes to unveil
assets facilitates truthtelling. This increases the possible ﬁnes that may be paid if
an accident occurs and, by the same token, reduces the regulatory rewards when no
accident occurs.4 The regulator and the judge are then substitutes.
Quite paradoxically, this is precisely when solving the moral hazard problem
(i.e., enforcing the eﬃcient level of care) becomes easier that the adverse selection
problem (i.e., ﬁnding out the value of the ﬁrm’s assets) is harder. The optimal
policy-mix under this ﬁrst regime calls for trading oﬀ the beneﬁts of ex post and ex
ante enforcements.
The scope for this substitutability between the regulator and the judge is then
challenged in more complex environments. The judge intervenes now whether reg-
ulatory enforcement has taken place or not.
In the second scenario, the judge commits resources to unveil assets whatever
the regulatory outcome, i.e., whether a regulatory inspection has taken place or not.
Under this second regime, both the regulator and the judge are useful in giving
incentives to the ﬁrm but they no longer interact.
Finally, in the last scenario, the judge may ﬁne tune the amount of resources
devoted to unveil the ﬁrm’s assets to the regulatory outcome. This scenario reveals
a complex web of interaction between the regulator and the judge. When the tech-
nology of ex ante audit is eﬃcient, then the likelihood that the ﬁrm may encounter
both the regulator and the judge is relatively high. When this technology is instead
ineﬃcient, then there is a high probability that the ﬁrm may just encounter the
judge.
Let us now review the relevant literature. Starting with Wittman (1977) and
White and Wittman (1983), an earlier trend of the literature has analyzed the per-
formances of ad hoc regulatory and liability mechanisms under either uncertainty
or imperfect information, sometimes arguing strongly in favor of liability rules.5
Shavell (1984a) discussed and compared the incentive properties of the two policies
in a moral hazard environment with also uncertainty on the level of harm.6 He
showed that liability undermines the level of care for potentially judgment-proof
parties or when injuring parties might escape litigation, whereas a regulatory stan-
dard performs well when uncertainty on the harm level is suﬃciently small. This
comparison is somewhat rudimentary both in terms of the incentive mechanisms
4As we will discuss below, these rewards may either be explicit or implicit, taking the form of
reputational gains for instance.
5See also Weitzman (1974) and Yohe (1978).
6See also Shavell (1984b) for some informal arguments.
3allowed and because it assumes away the cost of enforcement policies. Still in a
framework with ad hoc mechanisms, Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) did not see
liability and regulation necessarily as substitutes and argued that some complemen-
tarity may appear between both instruments.7 In the present paper, we also start as
these latter works from the presumption that an ex post investigation by the judge
certainly generates information8 whereas regulation helps in enforcing a standard of
care. Working in a model with optimal incentive mechanisms and endogenizing the
probability of investigation by either branch, we put on the front line of the analysis
the institutional details of the legal environment and the nature of the enforcement
costs showing that those are key elements to delineate the optimal policy-mix.
Boyer and Porrini (2001 and 2004) argued as we do here that regulation and
liability (more precisely extended liability towards principal vertically linked with a
judgment-proof ﬁrm) both involve some kind of monitoring activities. They stress
an interesting trade-oﬀ coming from the comparison between the cost of a captured
regulation and the cost of having the ﬁrm’s principals (be they lenders or parent
ﬁrms) with an objective diﬀerent from the social objective in a context of extended
liability. Contrary to these papers, we do not consider regulation and liability as two
mutually exclusive alternatives but we are interested in their optimal mix. Also, we
do not address the political economy issues and most speciﬁcally the reasons why
the regulator and the judge should be split as two diﬀerent entities, a question that
we tackle in a companion paper (Hiriart, Martimort and Pouyet (2005)).9
Finally, Mookherjee and P’Ng (1992) also stressed the diﬀerence between ex
ante and ex post monitoring10 but, following Shavell (1984a), addressed other sets
of issues related to the fact that ex post, the size of a damage is better known than
ex ante.
Section 2 presents our model. In Section 3, we provide some useful benchmarks
where the overall investigation capacity of the State is limited. In particular, the
judge never intervenes. This stresses the diﬃculty in building a regulatory mecha-
nism able to screen ﬁrms according to their assets values without bringing the judge
in. In Section 4, we introduce the judge into the picture and stress its interaction
with the regulator. Section 5 provides some extensions and discusses further the
allocation of tasks between the regulator and the judge. Section 6 concludes. Proofs
are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a relationship between a ﬁrm, a regulator and a judge. The cornerstone
of our analysis relies on the following ingredients: the environmental risk created
7In Hiriart, Martimort and Pouyet (2004), we showed that a joint use of regulation and liability
helps implementing the ﬁrst-best level of care when there are no a priori restriction on incentive
mechanisms.
8Not on harm as in Shavell (1984a) but on the level of the ﬁrm’ s assets, an assumption which
is more in lines with legal provisions in CERCLA in the U.S..
9Our point there is to show that splitting ex ante and ex post investigations is the best way to
prevent capture of both arms of control.
10To make the distinction easier, these authors call the second kind of monitoring ‘investigation’.
We won’t make such semantic diﬀerence.
4by the ﬁrm’s activities; the presence of asymmetric information in the form of both
adverse selection on the value of the ﬁrm’s assets and moral hazard on safety care;
the ex ante intervention of the regulator and ex post intervention of the judge. We
now describe these elements.
2.1 The Firm
By its mere activity, a ﬁrm may provoke an environmental damage of size D which
may harm third-parties. One may think of these damages as oil spills by oil-carrying
vessels during transportation or as chemical leakages from underground storage
tanks.
The probability of an accident π(.) depends on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀort e towards
safety care, which, for convenience, is assumed to be binary: e ∈ {0,1}. When the
ﬁrm exerts the high level of precautionary eﬀort (i.e., e = 1) the probability of an
accident is 1−π1. By contrast, if the ﬁrm undertakes the low eﬀort level (i.e., e = 0)
then the probability of a damage becomes 1−π0 > 1−π1, with ∆π ≡ π1−π0 > 0. To
exert eﬀort e = 1 (respectively e = 0), the ﬁrm must bear a positive non-monetary
cost ψ (respectively 0).11 The privately observed precautionary eﬀort is therefore a
moral hazard variable.
To focus on the interesting cases, we shall make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. It is always socially desirable that the ﬁrm exerts the high level of
precautionary eﬀort.
This assumption is innocuous since it always holds at equilibrium provided that
the damage D in the event of an accident is suﬃciently large to oﬀset the costs of
inducing such a high level of precautionary eﬀort.
Let us now consider another crucial feature of our model, namely the ﬁrm’s assets
value. The ﬁrm owns assets whose total value is denoted by θ ∈ Θ = {θ,θ}, with
∆θ ≡ θ − θ > 0. Let ν = Prob(θ = θ) = 1 − Prob(θ = θ). The ﬁrm is privately
informed on θ, an adverse selection parameter. As regards the possibility for the
ﬁrm to conceal the value of its assets, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Overstatement of the assets’ value by the ﬁrm is not possible.
Diﬀerently stated, claiming to be of type ˆ θ requires the ﬁrm to gather hard
evidences that the value of its assets is at least as high as ˆ θ.12
2.2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Interventions
We consider now the ‘control’ of the ﬁrm’s activities. This control has to be con-
sidered in a broad sense. It includes the many diﬀerent ways in which the ﬁrm’s
11Our model could easily be generalized to the case of a monetary cost of maintaining safety
care at the cost of a slighter more complex modeling.
12This is a standard assumption in the literature on contracting with ﬁnancially constrained
agent. See Gale and Hellwig (1985), Townsend (1979), and Lewis and Sappington (2000 and
2001).
5decisions are aﬀected and regulated by the State. The following distinction is use-
ful. Any intervention which occurs ex ante (before the realization of an accident)
is undertaken by a regulator R. By contrast, any intervention which takes place ex
post (after the realization of an accident) is undertaken by a judge J. The view we
adopt here is to consider the regulator and the judge as two arms of the same public
authority.
Transfers. Transfers to the ﬁrm depend on its environmental performances. Let
us denote by ta and tn the regulatory transfers to the ﬁrm following an accident or
not.
Although our modeling uses the monetary nature of those rewards and punish-
ments, a broader interpretation of those payments is available.13 Bad environmental
performances sometimes come also with damages to the ﬁxed capital of the ﬁrm
and to some stakeholders (like workers).14 Costs may also be indirect and include
tightened future regulations, increases in the number of costly environmental audits
undertaken in the future, refusals by the government of authorizations and permits,
and new taxes. A good management of environmental risk may also require the
training and hiring of experts as permanent employees who improve know-how and
aﬀect positively other ﬁrm’s activities.15 These transfers can also be viewed as a
black-box to model the long-term gains for the ﬁrm to develop a ‘good reputation’
or the long-term loss if the public authority decides to change the contractor after
an accident. Rewards cover the ﬁrm’s gains in reputation vis-` a-vis its customers,
potential contracting partners, the government, its shareholders and more generally
the ﬁnancial community as a whole.16,17
Ex Ante Intervention by the Regulator. Environmental regulators randomly
monitor ﬁrms under their jurisdiction, trying to ensure that safety standards have
been correctly implemented. When such investigation is launched, the regulator is
able to discover the precautionary eﬀort level eﬀectively chosen by the ﬁrm and can
force the ﬁrm to implement the standard of care e = 1 when it did not initially
perform such eﬀort.18 Importantly, whenever regulatory enforcement has taken
place, one knows for sure that the ﬁrm ends up exerting a high eﬀort.
13This broader interpretation is particularly useful in contexts, like in the U.S., where rewards
for good environmental performances may be banned.
14Major industrial accidents like Bhopal in India or AZF in France had these features.
15On the discussion on the indirect costs and beneﬁts of a good management of environmental
risks, see Lesourd and Schilizzi (2001).
16To be completely correct with our modeling which stresses the social costs of those monetary
transfers, one should also recognize a social cost of those non-monetary transfers. For instance,
reputation gains may also create switching costs in the relationship between the ﬁrm and some of
its contractual partners. Similarly, tightening future regulations may reduce entry on the market.
17Another interpretation is that the ﬁrm is given a base remuneration for its activities with an
additional bonus to be given at the end of the contractual relationship if no accident took place.
18Of course, this perfect observability upon ex ante investigation is an extreme assumption. In
practice regulators observe only how much resources are allocated within the ﬁrm to undertake
care and whether maintenance, inspections and safety routines are respected. Those observables
are related to the exact level of care but might actually be diﬀerent.
6The probability that such an ex ante regulatory audit is undertaken is pe, inter-
preted as the intensity of regulatory enforcement to discover the ﬁrm’s precautionary
eﬀort. Its social cost is CR,e(pe) with CR,e(·) increasing and convex and satisfying
the Inada conditions C0
R,e(0) = 0 and C0
R,e(1) = +∞ to ensure an interior solution
in all conﬁgurations studied below.19
Throughout most of our analysis, we shall consider that the ex ante regulator
is endowed with the power to verify the ﬁrm’s claim about the value of its assets.
By analogy with the audit of precautionary eﬀort, let pθ be the intensity of the
regulatory enforcement to discover the ﬁrm’s wealth. Its social cost is CR,θ(pθ) with
CR,θ(·) increasing and convex and satisfying C0
R,θ(0) = 0 and C0
R,θ(1) = +∞.
Note that two interpretations of this ex ante enforcement stage are possible.
In the ﬁrst one, the regulator always scrutinizes the ﬁrm but discovers its eﬀort
choice or wealth only with some probability. In the second one, the regulator only
investigates with some probability but always determines the eﬀort level or wealth
by doing so.
Ex Post Intervention by the Judge. In the event of an accident, a judge
launches a lawsuit against the ﬁrm. The purpose of this lawsuit is to ﬁnd out
compensation for harmed third-parties. How much compensation can be taken away
from the ﬁrm depends on the claimed value of its assets. We assume that the ex
post investigation by the judge allows to discover the true value of these assets and
the choice of safety care with probability qθ and qe respectively, which depend on the
amount of resources allocated to the judiciary branch. This ex post investigations
have a social cost CJ,θ(qθ) and CJ,e(qe), with CJ,.(·) being also increasing and convex
and satisfying the Inada conditions C0
J,.(0) = 0 and C0
J,.(1) = +∞.20
Contracts. A regulatory contract requests the ﬁrm to report the value of its assets
before this ﬁrm exerts any care. We denote by {ta(ˆ θ),tn(ˆ θ)} the transfers to the
ﬁrm if it claims having liability ˆ θ ∈ Θ depending on whether an accident does occur
or not. We denote by {pe(ˆ θ),pθ(ˆ θ)} (respectively {qe(ˆ θ),qθ(ˆ θ)}) the probabilities of
an ex ante (respectively ex post) audit of care and of the ﬁrm’s assets.
By the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting the public
authority to oﬀer such direct mechanisms which ensure that the ﬁrm truthfully
reveals the value of its assets. Incentive compatibility constraints will be studied
later on. Note that these mechanisms are in fact characterized a priori by diﬀerent
probabilities of both kinds of audits together with ex post transfers (rewards or ﬁnes)
that all depend on the ﬁrm’s claim on its assets. Fines are used in the following
cases: when the ﬁrm is audited, either ex ante or ex post, and the corresponding
auditor ﬁgures out that the ﬁrm did not comply with the safety standard or has
19Several studies have analyzed the cost of regulatory enforcement from an empirical viewpoint
and shown some positive relationships between the frequency of such investigations and its admin-
istrative costs. See for instance, Epple and Visscher (1984) and Cohen (1985).
20Again, two possible interpretations of our model are possible. In the ﬁrst one, the lawsuit is a
sure event but is successful in unveiling the true assets or the choice of safety care only with some
probability. In the second interpretation, the ex post investigation is itself random but always
succeeds in either unveiling the true level of assets or discovering the safety care level.
7understated its liabilities When the ﬁrm is found shirking, either on care or on the
value of its assets, the Maximal Punishment Principle applies.21 The ﬁrm has to
pay ﬁnes up to the value of its claimed assets to relax as much as possible incentive
constraints. This remark helps us to signiﬁcantly simplify the exposition of these
constraints.
Timing. The sequence of events unfolds as follows:
• At date 0, nature draws the type θ of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm is privately informed
about the assets’ value.
• At date 1, the ﬁrm is oﬀered a menu of contracts which, for all possible reports
about its assets, stipulate transfers conditional on the occurrence of an accident
and investigation policies.
• At date 1+, the ﬁrm announces ˆ θ or equivalently picks a contract among the
menu oﬀered and decides on the level of precautionary eﬀort e.
• At date 2−, the regulator audits the ﬁrm with probabilities {pe(ˆ θ),pθ(ˆ θ)}. If
an ex ante audit takes place, the regulator can verify the precautionary eﬀort
chosen by the ﬁrm. If this eﬀort diﬀers from the socially optimal one, the
regulator can both enforce the high level of precautionary eﬀort and impose
ﬁnes to the ﬁrm for non-compliance.
• At date 2, an accident occurs with probability 1 − π(e).
• At date 2+, in the event of an accident, a lawsuit may or may not be initiated
depending on the scenario investigated below. The judge discovers the value
of the ﬁrm’s assets and the ﬁrm’s choice of eﬀort with respective probabilities
qθ(ˆ θ) and qe(ˆ θ) and imposes a ﬁne if the ﬁrm is found cheating. In all cases,
transfers are paid according to the contract chosen at date 1+.
At this stage, let us emphasize that our setting implicitly assumes no separation
of tasks between the regulator and the judge: both the safety care level and the
ﬁrm’s wealth can be audited by the regulator and the judge.
2.3 Incentive Constraints
To understand the nature of the diﬀerent regulatory regimes that will be considered
thereafter, it is useful to write down the ﬁrm’s incentive constraints, which capture
both the moral hazard and adverse selection sides of the incentive problem.
Before doing so, the following result is straightforward but helpful in simplifying
the writing of these constraints: There is no need to check the assets of a ﬁrm
claiming being of type ¯ θ, or pθ(θ) = qθ(θ) = 0. This would indeed mean incurring
21See Becker (1968), Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 3).
8the cost of an ex post investigation without relaxing any incentive constraint since,
from Assumption 2, only understatement of assets is feasible.22
The θ-ﬁrm. First, consider a θ-ﬁrm with few assets. From Assumption 2, the only
incentive issue is to induce this ﬁrm to comply with the standard of care. We can
write its moral hazard incentive constraint as:
U(θ) ≡ π1tn(θ) + (1 − π1)ta(θ) − ψ ≥
[1 − pe(θ)]{π0tn(θ) + (1 − π0)[[1 − qe(θ)]ta(θ) − qe(θ)θ]} − pe(θ)(ψ + θ). (1)
The left-hand side depicts the equilibrium payoﬀ of this θ-ﬁrm once it complies with
the standard. Even if an ex ante or an ex post investigation takes place, the auditors
cannot detect any misconduct and the ﬁrm is not ﬁned. By contrast, when this θ-
ﬁrm shirks on the level of care, it may be detected ex ante with probability pe(θ). In
that case, it will be forced by the regulator to adopt the standard of due care and to
bear the cost ψ. The ﬁrm is also heavily punished whatever the future realization
of the environmental risk, i.e., the public authority imposes a net penalty equal to
the ﬁrm’s liability θ. Finally, if an accident occurs and the ex ante investigation has
been unsuccessful, the mechanism may require an ex post investigation of eﬀort for
this θ-ﬁrm; with probability qe(θ), this audit is successful and the ﬁrm is ﬁned up
to its liabilities.
Taking into account the limited liability constraint of a θ-ﬁrm, namely,
ta(θ) ≥ −θ, (2)
the moral hazard incentive constraint (1) can be rewritten as:






ψ. To exert the socially desirable eﬀort level, the
θ-ﬁrm must be given a liability rent R(pe(θ)) − θ.
Notice that if the probability of an ex ante investigation is suﬃciently large,
constraint (1) is trivially satisﬁed and the moral hazard problem disappears. In order
to get rid of this uninteresting case, we shall assume that the ex ante investigation
occurs not too frequently, i.e., 1−π1 < (1−pe(θ))(1−qe(θ))(1−π0) in the relevant
range. This implies that one wants to increase as much as possible the ﬁne paid by
the ﬁrm if an accident occurs so that limited liability on the ﬁrm’s side is a serious
impediment to ﬁrst-best regulation.23
The θ-ﬁrm. Let us now turn to the ¯ θ-ﬁrm. This ﬁrm may not only shirk by not
adopting the standard of due care but it may also hide its assets to limit its exposure
to liability payments if an accident occurs. This leads us to consider three incentive
22Indeed, given the focus on direct and truthful contracts, the ﬁrm will never lie about its assets
level at equilibrium; hence the sole purpose of the investigation policies is to relax the ﬁrm’s
incentive constraints. See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 3) and the references therein.
23More formally, when 1 − π1 ≥ (1 − pe(θ))(1 − qe(θ))(1 − π0), one can ﬁnd transfers ta(θ) and
tn(θ) which leave the ﬁrm with no rent and satisfy both the moral hazard incentive and limited
liability constraints, making the problem trivial.
9constraints:
• a pure moral hazard incentive constraint where the ¯ θ-ﬁrm might shirk only by
adopting a low level of care;
• a pure adverse selection incentive constraint where the ¯ θ-ﬁrm adopts the stan-
dard but pretends to have low assets;
• a mixed incentive constraint where both deviations take place simultaneously.
First, note that the pure moral hazard incentive constraint of a ¯ θ-ﬁrm can be
derived exactly as we did for a θ-ﬁrm. Given the ¯ θ-ﬁrm’s liability constraint, namely,
ta(¯ θ) ≥ −¯ θ, (4)
and the deﬁnition of the ¯ θ-ﬁrm’s expected utility, we ﬁnd:
U(¯ θ) ≡ π1tn(¯ θ) + (1 − π1)ta(¯ θ) − ψ ≥ R(pe(¯ θ)) − ¯ θ. (5)
Second, the pure adverse selection incentive constraint prevents the θ-ﬁrm from
understating its wealth given that it has chosen to comply with the standard of due
care. After rearranging terms, this constraint writes as:
U(θ) ≥ [1 − pθ(θ)][U(θ) − (1 − π1)qθ(θ)∆θ] − pθ(θ)(¯ θ + ψ). (6)
This pure adverse selection constraint can be interpreted in the following way. If
a θ-ﬁrm understates its wealth while complying with the standard, with probability
1 − pθ(θ) it obtains the rent U(θ) of a θ-ﬁrm if it is not found cheating by the ex
ante regulator, but faces a probability (1 − π1)qθ(θ) of being ﬁned up to the value
of the hidden assets ∆θ if an accident takes place and it is audited ex post. This
possibility reduces the rent associated with the understatement of wealth and thus
relaxes (6).
Third, considering now the possibility of deviations on both eﬀort and assets, we
get, after rearranging terms, the mixed incentive constraint:
U(¯ θ) ≥ [1 − pθ(θ)][R(pe(θ)) − θ] − pθ(θ)[¯ θ + ψpe(θ)]
− [1 − pθ(θ)]qθ(θ){(1 − π0)[1 − pe(θ)] + (1 − π1)pe(θ)}∆θ. (7)
In spirit, this is similar to the case of the pure adverse selection constraint. By
cheating on its wealth and by shirking of safety care, the ¯ θ-ﬁrm earns the limited
liability rent of the θ-ﬁrm only when it is unsuccessfully audited ex ante and ex
post. In all the other cases, it may either have to disgorge the whole value of its
assets (when one of the audits on wealth is successful) or part of this value (when it is
convinced of shirking on safety care but the audits on assets have been unsuccessful).
The following lemma is directly obtained from the inspection of the incentive
constraints (3), (5), (6) and (7).
Lemma 1. It is always optimal to set qe(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
10Indeed, that investigation probability does not aﬀect any of the incentive con-
straints. The underlying reason is the following: The nature of the incentive problem
is such that in the event of an accident the ﬁrm is ﬁned up to the value of its as-
sets. Checking ex post the choice of precaution eﬀort does not allow to impose an
additional penalty on the ﬁrm. Hence, the ex post audit of the ﬁrm’s safety care
level has no value. This clearly calls for a kind of partial separation of tasks of the
ex ante regulator and the ex post judge. The former must audit both the technical
(choice of precaution eﬀort) as well as the ﬁnancial (claimed value of assets) aspects
of the ﬁrm, whereas the latter conﬁnes to the ﬁnancial aspects.
2.4 Social Objectives
Optimal contracts are designed to maximize a social welfare function which incor-
porates the well-being of victims but also the cost of the incentive program (the
cost of regulatory transfers and the administrative costs of the investigations). This
objective writes as:







where Eθ(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the wealth level. Expressing
this objective as a function of the utility levels left to both types of ﬁrms, we get:




We thus see that the utility levels left to both types of ﬁrms should be reduced
as much as possible to maximize social welfare. Summarizing, under asymmetric







subject to constraints (3),(5),(6),(7) and U(θ) ≥ 0∀θ,
where we normalize the ﬁrm’s outside opportunities to zero.
2.5 Preliminaries
We shall now proceed to the ﬁnal simpliﬁcations of our setting.
To focus on the interesting cases, we will assume throughout the paper that
the so-called limited liability rent R(pe) − θ is strictly positive for all (θ,pe) in the
relevant domain. This condition implies that the θ-ﬁrm participation constraint is
implied by its limited liability and moral hazard incentive constraints which are
compounded into (3). For future references, we highlight that the limited liability
rent is decreasing in the ﬁrm’s assets, i.e., ﬁrms which have more assets earn lower
limited liability rents since, having to disgorge more cash in the event of an accident,
they obtain a lower rent to perform a given level of care.
11Since the ﬁrm’s rent is socially costly, the moral hazard incentive constraint of
the θ-ﬁrm will bind at equilibrium. We now focus on the incentive constraints of
the θ-ﬁrm.
Lemma 2. Consider that the moral hazard incentive constraint of the θ-ﬁrm (3)
binds. Then, the moral hazard incentive constraint of a θ-ﬁrm cannot be the only
binding incentive constraint for that ﬁrm.
The intuition is immediate. If it were the case, then the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms
would be audited on their choice of safety care with the same probability (i.e.,
pe(θ) = pe(θ)) and the θ-ﬁrm would have an incentive to cheat on its wealth, for the
mere reason that the limited liability rent decreases with the level of assets revealed
by the ﬁrm.
Moreover:
Lemma 3. Consider that the moral hazard incentive constraint of the θ-ﬁrm (3)
binds. Then, the pure adverse selection incentive constraint of the ¯ θ-ﬁrm (6) is







In a nutshell, this condition summarizes the relative severity of the moral hazard
and adverse selection problems. A large cost of eﬀort ψ entails that the ﬁrm is
reluctant to exert the high level of safety care; similarly, a low probability diﬀerential
∆π implies that the ﬁrm’s reward will weakly depend on the choice of precaution
eﬀort, again traducing a severe incentive moral hazard problem. By contrast, a large
wealth diﬀerential ∆θ makes the adverse selection problem more stringent,as the θ-
ﬁrm has thus strong incentives to understate its wealth. Roughly speaking, when
ψ/∆π
∆θ is small (respectively large) the adverse selection problem is more (respectively
less) severe than the moral hazard one.
To conclude, diﬀerent regimes appear depending on the relative severity of the
moral hazard vs. the adverse selection problem of the θ-ﬁrm. Inside each regime,
two possibilities have to be accounted for, depending on whether the pure moral
hazard incentive constraint of that ﬁrm is binding or not.
3 Benchmarks
To better understand some of our results, it is useful to start looking at a few
benchmarks in which the ability to audit the ﬁrm is limited .
3.1 No Ex Ante Investigation
Let us start by assuming that the cost of an ex ante investigation is inﬁnite, which
forces to set pθ(θ) = pe(θ) = 0 for any θ. According to Lemma 3, the relevant
12incentive constraints for the θ-ﬁrm are its moral hazard and its adverse selection
incentive constraints, which write respectively as follows:
U(θ) ≥ R(0) − θ, (9)
U(θ) ≥ U(θ) − ∆θqθ(θ)(1 − π1). (10)
Straightforward manipulations show the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that only the ex post investigation is feasible. Then, an
unconstrained regime always emerges, in which constraints (3) and (10) are binding.










∆θ(1 − π1). (11)
The judge’s intervention only bears on the ﬁnancial claims made by the ﬁrm.
By increasing the frequency of its audit, the θ-ﬁrm which understates its assets
will be caught lying more frequently in the event of an accident (which occurs with
probability 1 − π1 when the ﬁrm exerts the high level of safety care)
3.2 No Ex Post Investigation
Let us now suppose that the cost of an ex post investigation is inﬁnite, which forces
to set qθ(θ) = 0 for any θ.24 According to Lemma 3, the relevant incentive constraints
for the θ-ﬁrm are its moral hazard and its mixed incentive constraints, which write
respectively as follows:
U(θ) ≥ R(pe(θ)) − θ, (12)
U(θ) ≥ [1 − pθ(θ)][R(pe(θ)) − θ] − pθ(θ)(θ + ψpe(θ)). (13)
Depending on whether (13) only or both (13) and (12) are binding, we have two
cases to consider, which we label respectively the unconstrained and the constrained
regimes. We shall focus ﬁrst on the unconstrained regime.
Proposition 2. Assume that only the ex ante investigation is feasible. Then, an
unconstrained regime, in which constraints (3) and (13) are binding, emerges pro-
vided that R(0) ≤ [R(pea
θ (θ)) + ∆θ][1 − pea
θ (θ)] − pea
θ (θ)pea
e (θ)ψ. Only the θ-ﬁrm is
investigated with positive probabilities pea
e (θ) and pea





























e (θ)) + ∆θ + ψp
ea
e (θ)]. (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The ex ante audit probabilities satisfy a marginal cost equal marginal beneﬁt
rule. Increasing the frequency of the ex ante audit on safety care allows to reduce
24Remind that qe(θ) = 0 is optimal.
13the limited liability rent of a θ-ﬁrm and to reduce the θ-ﬁrm’s incentives to exert
a low precaution eﬀort and to understate its wealth. By contrast, increasing the
frequency of the ex ante audit on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial claim only reduces the θ-ﬁrm’s
incentives to understate its liabilities.
In Appendix A.1, we solve the unconstrained regime. Roughly speaking, the
lessons of the unconstrained regime extend those of the constrained one. One com-
mon feature of both regimes is that the probability of an ex ante investigation
decreases with the claimed assets. However, when the uncertainty on the ﬁrm’s
assets is small enough, the gain from shirking on safety care is greater than the gain
from lying on assets value. Hence, the pure moral hazard incentive constraint of
a θ-ﬁrm is necessarily also binding. To relax this constraint, the probability of an
ex ante investigation of a θ-ﬁrm is now positive although lower than when assets
are common knowledge. Because (12) is now binding, the multiplier λ of the mixed
incentive constraint (13) is less than ν. Compared with what happens in an uncon-
strained regime, this reduces the marginal beneﬁts of increasing the probability of
both an ex post and an ex ante investigation of a θ-ﬁrm. Indeed, now the the mixed
incentive constraint can be relaxed by using the probability of auditing ex ante the
θ-ﬁrm.
In the remaining analysis, since they share very similar qualitative features, we
shall focus on the unconstrained regimes only.
4 The Regulator and the Judge
Let us now turn to the full-ﬂedged model where the claim of the ﬁrm on its assets
can possibly be checked ex post at some cost by the judge. The main lesson of
the costly state veriﬁcation models ` a la Townsend (1978)-Gale and Hellwig (1985)
applies to our framework: The threat of being punished when caught lying reduces
the ﬁrm’s incentives to understate the value of its assets. The main question we
address in this section is thus: How the ex ante and ex post investigation policies
ought to be optimally combined?
Adverse-selection-biased incentive problem. We ﬁrst consider the case in
which condition (8) holds so that the adverse selection constraint of the θ-ﬁrm is
more demanding than the mixed constraint. In a nutshell, the adverse selection
problem is more severe than the moral hazard one. The following proposition is
easily obtained.
Proposition 3. Consider that (8) holds. Then, in an unconstrained regime, only













































∆θ(1 − π1)(1 − p
∗
θ(θ)).
14Moral-hazard-biased incentive problem. By contrast, when condition (8) does
not hold, the mixed constraint is more demanding than the adverse selection one.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Consider that (8) does not hold. Then, in an unconstrained regime,
only the θ-ﬁrm is audited with probabilities p∗∗
e (θ), p∗∗
θ (θ) and q∗∗





















































∆θ[1 − π1 + ∆πp
∗∗
e (θ)](1 − p
∗∗
θ (θ)).
Comparison. Let us ﬁrst compare the previous two cases.
Proposition 5. If the moral hazard incentive problem is more severe than the ad-
verse selection one, then:
• the ex ante regulator specializes more in the technical audit and less in the
ﬁnancial one, i.e., p∗∗
e (θ) ≥ p∗
e(θ) and p∗∗
θ (θ) ≤ p∗
θ(θ);
• the ex post judge specializes more in the ﬁnancial audit, i.e., q∗∗
θ (θ) ≥ q∗
θ(θ).
The reverse holds when the adverse selection incentive problem is more severe than
the moral hazard one.
We now want to understand the impact of complementing the ex ante regulation
with an ex post judicial intervention.
Proposition 6. Complementing the ex ante regulation with an ex post intervention
reduces the ex ante audit on eﬀort but has an ambiguous impact on the ex ante audit
of the ﬁrm’s wealth.
5 Extensions
5.1 Functional Separation
We now study a more constrained situation in which the ex ante regulator is bound to
intervene on the technical aspects whereas the ex post judge’s intervention concerns
only the ﬁnancial aspects. This coincides with a situation in which there is a full
functional separation of the various auditors. In terms of our model, this amounts
to assuming that pθ(θ) = qe(θ) = 0 for all claim θ ∈ Θ.
According to Lemma 8, the adverse selection problem is more demanding than
the moral hazard one, and the relevant constraint for a θ-ﬁrm are:
U(θ) ≥ R(pe(θ)) − θ,
U(θ) ≥ U(θ) − (1 − π1)qθ(θ)∆θ. (16)
The following proposition is easily obtained.
15Proposition 7. Consider functional separation between the ex ante regulator and
the ex post judge and an unconstrained regime in which constraints (3) and (16) are
binding. Only the θ-ﬁrm is audited with probabilities pfs
e (θ) and q
fs
















θ (θ)) = (1 − π1)∆θ.
In that case, there is a clear separation between the tasks of the regulator and
the judge. Any change in the cost of one kind of investigation has only an impact
on the probability of using that particular investigation.
It is worth describing the optimal transfers for both types. For a ¯ θ-ﬁrm, whose




a (¯ θ) = −¯ θ,
t
fs
n (¯ θ) = −¯ θ +
(1 − pfs
e (θ))ψ


















These transfers decompose the role of the regulator and the judge. Everything
happens as if the ¯ θ-ﬁrm was now always forced to pay ﬁnes up to the value of
its assets when an accident takes place but then receives an extra reward for a
good environmental performance. This extra reward can be decomposed into two
pieces: First, the incentive reward oﬀered to a θ-ﬁrm to solve its moral hazard
problem; second, a pure adverse selection reward to induce truthtelling. The ﬁrst of
these rewards is reduced through an ex ante investigation whereas the second one
is reduced by the threat of an ex post prosecution.
In an unconstrained regime, the sum of these two rewards suﬃces to solve the
moral hazard problem of a ¯ θ-ﬁrm.
5.2 Immunization
Suppose now that the judge intervenes only after an accident and the regulator did
not intervene ex ante. The two arms intervene thus to solve diﬀerent incentive prob-
lems and in diﬀerent states of nature. We call this the ‘immunization requirement’.
As in the previous section, the adverse selection constraint (6) which writes as
U(θ) ≥ U(θ) − (1 − π1)[1 − pe(θ)]qθ(θ)∆θ (17)
is binding at the optimum. Note the diﬀerence with the case of functional separation:
with immunization, the ex post judge is bound to intervene only when the ex ante
regulator has not.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Consider the immunization requirement in conjunction with func-
16tional separation and an unconstrained regime in which constraints (3) and (17) are
binding. Only the θ-ﬁrm is audited with probabilities pim
e (θ) and qim
























(1 − π1)(1 − p
im
e (θ))∆θ. (19)
Remember that the θ-ﬁrm prefers to hide its wealth than to shirk on the level of
care because doing so reduces the probability of accident and thus the overall proba-
bility of liability exposure. Decreasing the probability of the regulator’s monitoring
increases the likelihood that the judge intervenes ex post. This increases the threat
of being ﬁned if an accident occurs.
Although both kinds of intervention help relaxing incentive constraints, the reg-
ulator is relatively ineﬃcient in inducing the θ-ﬁrm to disgorge cash. The judge is
instead crucial in doing so. However, the judge intervenes only when an ex ante
investigation did not take place, i.e., with probability (1 − π1)(1 − q(θ)). Condition
(19) reﬂects the fact that the marginal beneﬁt of an ex post investigation depends
on the probability that an ex ante investigation did not take place.
With immunization, everything happens as if, following the regulator’s interven-
tion, the ﬁrm pays a ﬁne θ that can be raised up to θ if the judge intervenes. To
reinforce this intuition, let us describe the optimal transfers. Given that both the
limited liability constraint (2) and the moral hazard incentive constraint (3) of a
θ-ﬁrm are binding, we ﬁnd:
t
im
a (θ) = −θ, (20)
t
im
n (θ) = −θ +
(1 − pim
e (θ))ψ
π1 − π0(1 − pim
e (θ))
. (21)
For a ¯ θ-ﬁrm, given that both the limited liability constraint (4) and the pure adverse
selection constraint (6)) are binding, we ﬁnd:
t
im
a (¯ θ) = −¯ θ, (22)
t
im
n (¯ θ) = −¯ θ +
(1 − pim
e (θ))ψ



















These transfers can easily be interpreted. Everything happens as if the maximal
ﬁne imposed on a ¯ θ-ﬁrm was equal to its assets but there existed a reward for a
good environmental performance incorporating the information rent withdrawn by
this ﬁrm from private knowledge of its assets. Indeed, the right-hand side of (23)
can be decomposed into two pieces: ﬁrst, the moral hazard incentive reward which
induces a high level of care from the θ-ﬁrm; second, the adverse selection incentive
reward which facilitates truthtelling. Although the ﬁrst of these terms is reduced
with an ex ante investigation, the second one increases with it.
In this setting, some substitutability between the regulator and the judge ap-
17pears.25 When the regulator beneﬁts from a better supervision technology (C0
R,e(·)
being lower), an ex ante investigation becomes easier, pim
e (θ) increases and the
marginal beneﬁt from an ex post investigation decreases (from (19)). Increasing
the frequency of ex ante intervention makes it less valuable to call the judge ex
post. Reciprocally, when the ex post investigation technology of the judge improves
(C0
J,θ(·) being lower), qim
θ (θ) increases and this decreases the marginal beneﬁt from
auditing the ﬁrm ex ante (from (18)). Altogether, these results show the substi-
tutability between the two arms of enforcement. Although both are jointly used to
improve incentives, the better one instrument, the less used is the other, at least as
long as the regulatory intervention immunizes the ﬁrm against ex post prosecution.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model to study the respective roles of the regulator and the
judge in the control of environmental risk. Our starting point is that there exists
a separation of tasks between the regulator who controls safety care ex ante, i.e.,
before any accident realizes, and the judge who intervenes ex post to ﬁnd out the
true value of the ﬁrm’s assets for compensation. Although diﬀerent in nature and
in timing, both instruments are useful in providing incentives to the ﬁrm. However,
the precise interaction between the regulator and the judge depends on the rule
determining the Courts’ intervention.26
The ﬁrst two scenarii we have explored in this paper could be interpreted in
terms of real world legal principles.
In our ﬁrst scenario, the ﬁrm is insulated from the perspective of a lawsuit if
it has already been inspected by a regulator, which ensures that the high level of
eﬀort has been exerted. Considering the fact that the ﬁrm is not prosecuted if an
accident occurs and that it must have exerted a high level of care, this ﬁrst scenario
has something in common with the negligence rule in the law doctrine where injurers
are not held liable for the damage they have caused if they have complied with a
standard of due care.
In our second scenario, the judge may intervene if an accident takes place even
if the regulator did. This has something in common with the strict liability rule
in the law doctrine where injurers are held liable for the damage they have caused
whatever the care they have exerted.
With this comparison in mind, we can reinterpret our main results in the follow-
ing way. The immunization of ﬁrms from legal investigation that follows a regulatory
inspection under the negligence rule creates a substitutability between the regulator
and the judge. Instead, under strict liability, the regulator and the judge do not















(1 − π1)∆θ < 0.
26We did not rank the policies described through scenarii 1 to 3. Obviously, the greatest social
welfare would be obtained when using the highest number of instruments, hence under conditioning,
as long as interventions do not involve ﬁxed costs (CR(0) = 0 and CJ(0) = 0).
18interact.
Our model provides thus strong predictions on the extent of ex ante and ex post
enforcements. A negative correlation between expenditures/investigations of both
branches is expected under the negligence rule whereas expenditures/investigations
in the judiciary branch are not correlated with the regulatory expenditures/investigations
under strict liability. We are not aware of any such empirical study but such en-
deavour would certainly be worth undertaking.
From a theoretical perspective, our model could be extended along several lines.
First, risk-aversion on the ﬁrms’ side may also be an important concern. The pres-
ence of the regulator and the judge would aﬀect the standard trade-oﬀ between
insurance and incentives under moral hazard. We feel conﬁdent that the general
lessons of our work will carry over to those environments.
Second, the legal procedures by which the judge uncovers assets and pierces the
corporate veil have been modeled here as a black-box. Much should be made to
understand this stage of the analysis in more details.
We also found that, in the event of an accident, providing the judge with the
possibility to run a separate expertise about the ﬁrm’s choice of precautionary eﬀort
is useless. This calls for some sort of separation between the regulatory tasks and
the legal intervention: the regulator limits its intervention to the ‘technical’ aspects
of the underlying risk (i.e., the care exerted by the ﬁrm) and the judge focuses on
‘ﬁnancial’ aspects, i.e., the ﬁrm’s collectable wealth. Clearly, further research is
warranted in order to reﬁne these results and to reach a better understanding of the
interaction between ex ante and ex post interventions.
For instance, we have taken for granted the cooperation between the regulator
and the judge. These restrictions are reasonable approximations of real-world in-
stitutions. However, they abstract away from political economy considerations of
conﬂict of interests between regulators and judges. Introducing such considerations
should allow us to build a more satisfactory theory of the organization of the control
of risky industrial activities and of the separation or integration of regulators and
judges.27 We plan to investigate those issues in future research.
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21A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Unconstrained regime. Consider that only constraints (3) and (13) are binding.





[1 − pθ(θ)][R(pe(θ)) − θ] − pθ(θ)(θ + ψpe(θ))
	
+ (1 − ν){R(pe(θ)) − θ + CR,e(pe(θ)) + CR,θ(pθ(θ))}.
Solving for the ﬁrst-order conditions yields the investigation probabilities stated in
Proposition 2. The second-order conditions are satisﬁed provided that: ∂2A/∂pθ(θ)2 ≥
0, which always holds thanks to the convexity of the cost functions; ∂2A/∂pe(θ)2 ≥ 0,
which always holds since R00(.) > 0; ∂2A/∂pθ(θ)2∂2A/∂pe(θ)2 ≥ (∂2A/∂pθ(θ)∂pe(θ),
which holds when costs are suﬃciently convex.
Finally, the unconstrained regime holds as long as:
R(0) ≤ (1 − pθ(θ))[R(pe(θ)) + ∆θ] − pθ(θ)[θ + ψpe(θ)].
Constrained regime. In a constrained regime, the moral hazard constraint of a
θ-ﬁrm (12) is also binding. The optimal contract solves:
min
pe(.),pθ(.)
Eθ {U(θ) + CR,e(pe(θ)) + CR,θ(pθ(θ))},
s.t. U(θ) = R(pe(θ)) − θ,∀θ,
U(θ) = (1 − pθ(θ))U(θ) − pθ(θ)(θ + ψpe(θ)).
Deﬁne ˜ R(θ) = R(pe(θ)) and h = CR,e(R−1). With this change of variables, we can





˜ R(θ) + h( ˜ R(θ))
o
,
s.t. (1 − pθ(θ))( ˜ R(θ) − θ) − pθ(θ)[θ + ψR
−1( ˜ R(θ))] = ˜ R(θ) − θ.
This is a convex problem provided that h is convex, which amounts to C00
R,e/C0
R,e ≥
R00, which holds provided, again, that costs are suﬃciently convex.
Denote by λ the multiplier associated to the equality constraint in the previous
























[R(pe(θ)) + ∆θ + ψpe(θ)].
λ is obtained by using the equality constraint for the values of the investigation
22probabilities deﬁned above. This interior solution is the solution of the optimization
problem provided that λ ≤ ν. Otherwise, a corner solution emerges with pe(θ) = 0,
and we are back to the unconstrained regime.
23